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Abstract. We use a model of opinion formation to study the consequences of some mechanisms attempting
to enforce the right behaviour in a society. We start from a model where the possible choices are not
equivalent (such is the case when the agents decide to comply or not with a law) and where an imitation
mechanism allow the agents to change their behaviour based on the influence of a group of partners. In
addition, we consider the existence of two social constraints: a) an external authority, called monitor, that
imposes the correct behaviour with infinite persuasion and b) an educated group of agents that act upon
their fellows but never change their own opinion, i.e., they exhibit infinite adamancy. We determine the
minimum number of monitors to induce an effective change in the behaviour of the social group, and
the size of the educated group that produces the same effect. Also, we compare the results for the cases
of random social interactions and agents placed on a network. We have verified that a small number of
monitors are enough to change the behaviour of the society. This also happens with a relatively small
educated group in the case of random interactions.
PACS. XX.XX.XX No PACS code given
1 Introduction and review of the original
model
The problem of opinion formation has been studied from
several perspectives, including quantitative approaches,
by many authors in the last decades. The seminal ideas
of Axelrod on the dissemination of culture [1] have been
re-ellaborated from many interdisciplinary sides. Of par-
ticular interest are also the fundamental papers of Galam
(see for example [2,3], and also the recent review [4]). In
many of these works, the authors propose simple quantita-
tive models that try to capture the fundamental processes
determining the emergency of consensus in a population
(see [5] and [6] for thorough reviews). Example of this situ-
ation are voter models, in which the dynamics is analyzed
using the tools of the statistical mechanics of magnetic
systems [7,8,9].
It is generally assumed that the choice of the agents is
between equivalent options. There are notable exceptions,
such as [3] cited above. Indeed, in many social situations
the options presented to the individual may not be equiv-
alent. For example, each agent may have a personal bias
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towards one or the other, as studied in [10,11]. In other
cases, the options may be endowed with an intrinsic value
derived from cultural, ethical or legal foundations. In a re-
cent article we studied a simplified instance of such a prob-
lem [12]. Possible examples of widespread—however ille-
gal—conducts are the decision of using a cell phone while
driving a car, of not stopping at a red light, or of driv-
ing while intoxicated. Beside the subject’s idiosyncrasy,
the choice of one attitude or the opposite is influenced
(and even determined) by their background (education,
cultural values, etc.) as well as the pressure of the social
environment [13] and of the authorities [14].
From a psychological point of view, the influence of a
social group depends on the size of the group, on their per-
suasion capability, and on the distance from the subject
(which may be spatial or abstract, in the sense of personal
relationships) [15]. The resistance of a society to the con-
vergence of its members’ opinions has been considered by
ourselves in [16], and also in [17,18,8]. Besides the influ-
ence of social acquaintances, in real societies other factors
may be of relevance: authorities can introduce a system of
control and punishment [19] through a municipal or road
police or even, in some social events, by guard duties or
other security officials. This has been studied in [20], where
a strong leader and external social impact are present. In
addition to this, there may exist a group of more edu-
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cated and responsible people that could influence the rest
of the society but will not be influenced by them. This
group forms effectively a core of the “correct” opinion or
behaviour.
In this paper we study the consequences of these mech-
anisms that try to “constrain” the society to adopt the
correct behaviour (which will also be referred to as “opin-
ion”). As in Ref. [12], we consider a system where the
agents may adopt one of two options with different val-
ues. The model of social influence is implemented as an
imitation behaviour: agents tend to imitate the opinion of
the others, which may be the right or the wrong one. As
a result of this social influence agents may change their
opinion. In addition to this, we consider also the follow-
ing two new ingredients. On the one hand the effect of
authority, which we already addresed in [14]. Here we de-
fine agents or mechanisms called “monitors”, who are in
some way external to the social group and have the effect
of imposing the correct opinion when the social agent is
in contact with them. In real systems they may act by
exerting some kind of controlling or punitive action: cam-
eras, admonitions, reprimands or fines. Many times the
presence of the monitor acts as a dissuasive factor—and
the eventual fine too—enforcing the right behaviour on
the agents that come to interact with them. An example
of monitors are traffic police staying at a crossroads and
applying fines to drivers violating the red light or using
their cell phones; other examples are school monitors or
surveillance cameras in public places.
The second ingredient is the effect of an educated
group that never abandons the correct opinion. The effect
of this core group is the same as the conventional social
influence by imitation. Indeed, the existence of inflexible
agents has been considered before in [17,10,11]. The fact
that they cannot be induced to adopt the “wrong” opin-
ion produces a different dynamics, as was shown in [21]
in the context of the influenza pandemics. Indeed, we will
show that, in many cases, it is possible to induce a ma-
jor change in the opinion of the population by setting a
fraction of “polite” or “educated” agents (those support-
ing the “right” option) as well as through controls. Both
influences are able to generate a change in the society in a
reasonable period of time. The fraction of educated agents
necessary to induce a global change depends on the rela-
tive value of the opinions, on the average adamancy of the
group and on the connectivity of the network.
Let us briefly review the dynamics of the original
model presented in Ref. [12]. We consider a population
of N interacting agents, each of them having an opin-
ion attribute, x, and a tendency to conserve this opin-
ion, that we call adamancy, a. The opinion is bi-valuated,
x ∈ {x1, x2}, with x2 > x1, implying that opinion 2 is
more valuable than opinion 1. The dynamics of the sys-
tem is as follows. At each time step an agent i is picked
up at random. This agent is prompted to change his opin-
ion because of the influence of a group of k individuals.
These are chosen at random at each interaction and a poll
is performed:
If: aixi + nixi − (k − ni)x
′
i


≥ 0 then agent i keeps
opinion xi,
< 0 then agent i changes
to opinion x′
i
,
(1)
where ni is the number of agents (belonging to the influ-
ence group of size k) sharing the same opinion as agent i
and x′
i
is the alternative opinion, sustained by the remain-
ing k−ni agents. Thus, there is a competition between the
two opinion values. In addition, note that agent i weighs
his own opinion (and only this one) with his adamancy ai.
The final state depends on the distribution of adamancy
a of the population, on the fraction fh of agents that have
initially the higher opinion, and also on the distribution of
k. The relative values of x1 and x2 are also relevant, but
will be kept fixed in our study at x1 = 1 and x2 = 2 (as
in [12]).This dynamics has only two attractors in a strict
sense: consensus of x1 or consensus of x2. Nevertheless, the
time needed to reach such stable states can be extremely
long and irrelevant in any social context. Typical phase
diagrams will be shown in the left panels of Figs. 1 and 2.
From Eq. (1) it is clear that for a/k > 2 the agents can-
not modify their opinions as a result of the interactions.
The consequence in the diagram (Fig. 1, left panel) is a
coexistence of opinions for all values of fh, reflecting the
fact that no interaction ends up in a change of opinion.
This region represents a very stubborn society, and the
system is frozen at the initial condition. See Ref. [12] for
a detailed explanation of the original model.
In the following sections we build upon this model and
discuss the extended results.
2 Enforcing the right behaviour
Let us now consider two different mechanisms that can
modify the time evolution and the attractors of the dy-
namics. These mechanisms are aimed to improve the
chances of adoption of the higher valued opinion. The
first one is to introduce monitors, who induce the agents
to adopt the desired opinion. We model these monitor-
ing agents as external to the society and having infinite
persuasion. This means that when agents with opinion x1
detect, or are detected by, a monitor, they always switch
to opinion x2, independently of their adamancy and the
opinion poll of the group of influence. This change is not
permanent, and the agent is able to return to x1 if the so-
cial pressure, given by Eq. (1), makes it so in subsequent
interactions.
A second modification in the dynamics is the existence
of a “core” of educated agents, i.e. agents that are—or
have been—convinced of the benefits of the higher opin-
ion and that have an infinite adamancy. When interacting
with other agents they never change their opinion but,
unlike the monitors, their influence on other agents is the
same as that of any other agent with opinion x2. This
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Fig. 1. Phase diagrams showing the effect of the monitors in a
population of N = 1000 agents, after 100 interactions per agent
(in average), and homogeneous connectivity with k = 10. Left
panel: no monitors [12]. Right panel: 1 monitor per 100 agents
(P = 0.01). The region where the society converges to a state
of opinion x2 is much wider in this last case than in the situ-
ation with no monitors. In both diagrams, each point consist
of 100 realizations. White squares correspond to states of co-
existence of opinions (named 2 clusters states, in accordance
with [12]). The scale of grays indicates the fraction of realiza-
tions that arrive to a consensus (with darker indicating rare
consensus, lighter frequent consensus. White regions (without
squares) correspond to consensus of either opinion, as shown.
core of educated agents provide an unsupervised pressure
favouring the higher valued opinion x2.
In this section we detail the effects of these two types
of social influence within a mean field scheme, while in
Section 3 we discuss the situation where the agents are
distributed on a complex network.
2.1 Monitors
To start with and following Ref. [12], we consider a system
of N = 1000 agents with an initial fraction fh of them
sustaining the right opinion (0 ≤ fh ≤ 1). We call P
the probability of an agent to be detected by a monitor.
If the agent is detected, he changes his opinion to x2,
otherwise he interacts with k neighbours and perform the
comparison given by Eq. (1). As a result of the poll he
can change or not his state. The simulation runs for a
total time of 100 interactions per agent. We consider this
a reasonable period of time to study social changes (even
though in some social situations more interactions might
be relevant for the decision making; see [12] for an analysis
on this dependence). We remark that we will study two
situations: a) a fixed number of neighbours (particularly
we will consider a delta probability distribution with k =
10), and b) a number of neighbours determined at random
from an exponential probability distribution (with 〈k〉 =
10). Note that in this latter case it is more likely to have
a low number of connections that a high one.
We have verified that the dynamics is very sensitive to
the action of the monitors. In Fig. 1 we compare the phase
diagram obtained with no monitors (left panel), with the
diagram obtained with a probability P = 0.01 of being
monitored, i.e., there is in average 1 monitor for every
100 agents (right panel). It can be observed that the area
occupied by the consensus of the opinion x2 in the right
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Fig. 2. Same phase diagram of Fig. 1 but with an exponen-
tial connectivity distribution with 〈k〉 = 10. Again, the left
panel corresponds to the situation in which no monitors are
present [12]. The right panel shows the diagram obtained af-
ter the inclusion of 1 monitor per 100 agents. Note that the
horizontal scale is not the same of Fig. 1.
panel is much bigger than in the unsupervised case (left
panel). The region that contributes most to the increase of
consensus of the higher opinion is the one with a/〈k〉 < 2,
a boundary that depends on the relative values of x2 and
x1 in the present model. When a/〈k〉 > 2 the system con-
verges to opinion x2 but over very long times, because of
the diluted interaction with the monitor. Very long times
are not realistic in social sciences, but we should remark
that even if both opinions coexist we have verified that
the number of agents sustaining opinion x2 constitute a
very large majority.
Besides, the original model had a small region of con-
sensus of opinion x1 in the region of low adamancy and
low fh that has disappeared. This region exhibits now a
mixed state, produced by two competing effects. On one
side, monitors convert agents to opinion x2. On the other,
as their adamancy is low, agents are quickly convinced by
their neighbours to choose x1. This dynamics leads to a
fluctuating state that is perpetuated over time, and no
consensus is reached.
In short, if we consider an infinite time of interaction
(which is not reasonable for social systems) the system
would converge to the opinion x2 for any value of the
adamancy, with the exception of the regions described as
fluctuating states in the previous paragraph.
For the sake of completeness we have also studied the
case of an exponential distribution of connectivity, with
〈k〉 = 10 (see Fig. 2). It can be verified that the region
of consensus of opinion x1 disappears, but the area cov-
ered by the higher opinion, x2, even if greater than in the
case with no monitors, does not exhibit a significant vari-
ation. This occurs because the exponential distribution
privileges lower connectivities, becoming harder to reach
consensus of the high valued opinion, even with the same
concentration of monitors.
If this is the effect of just ten monitors (representing
1% of the population), one can assume that increasing
their number will induce full adoption of opinion x2 for
any value of the adamancy. One possible way of verifying
this point is to calculate from the phase diagrams the rel-
ative areas of the regions where the opinions x1 and x2
are stable, compared with the area of the rectangle going
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up from 0 ≤ fh ≤ 1 and adamancy from 0 ≤ a ≤ 2.5.
These results are presented in Fig. 3 for the case of the
delta distribution of connectivities. The relative areas of
the x1 and x2 opinions are plotted as a function of the
probability P , and it is possible to see that a very small
number of monitors is enough to induce an almost full
consensus on the population. This happens in two stages.
When there is just one monitor every 100 agents, as is the
case in the diagram of Fig. 1, there are almost no more
realizations with consensus of x1 (it is strictly zero when
the number of monitors is greater than 2% of the popu-
lation). With ten times as many monitors the population
reaches consensus of x2 in 90% of the area considered.
A smooth transition consisting in an increasing number
of x2 opinions connects these two values. In this region,
the growing presence of monitors speeds up the dynam-
ics. Accordingly, the x2 area grows even if the number
of interactions per agent is the same in all cases. When
P = 0.1, the x2 curve reaches 90% of the total area and
stops growing. For this density of monitors, all coexis-
tence regions of a/〈k〉 < 2 (except the fluctuating ones)
are converted to x2-consensus. In order to convert popu-
lations with a/〈k〉 > 2 and reach maximum consensus of
opinion x2, it would be necessary more than 1, 000 inter-
actions per agent, a number ten times greater that the one
considered to be reasonable in the present work.
2.2 Social pressure
The effect of a social “hard core” group in the society is
also impressive. Let us consider that a fraction of agents
n/N stand by the right opinion x2 and have an infi-
nite adamancy. The obtained effect is similar to the one
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Fig. 3. Effect of the relative number of monitors for a delta
distribution of connectivities. Main panel: Fractions of the total
area for which the consensus of opinions x1 and x2 are obtained
(after 100 interactions per agent in average) as a function of
the fraction of monitors, P . It is possible to see that the area
covered by the opinion x1 goes to zero for a very small number
of monitors, 1 per 100 agents (0.01 on the abscissa). Besides,
the opinion x2 stabilizes at 90% of the total area for 1 monitor
per 10 agents (0.1 on the abscissa). Inset: Area of x1-consensus
in logarithmic scale.
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Fig. 4. Effect of 100 educated agents in a population of
N = 1000 agents, with 〈k〉 = 10 and a final time of 100 steps
per agent (in average). Observe that the educated agents can-
not change their opinions. So, fh = 0 implies that no regular
agents start with opinion x = 2, but a 10% of educated agents
are already present in the whole system. Left panel: delta distri-
bution of connectivities. Right panel: exponential distribution
of connectivities. Comparing with the left panels of Figs. 1 and
2, one can verify that the region where the society converges
to a state of opinion x2 is wider and goes to lower values of fh,
than in the situation with no educated agents.
of including monitors, but with a sensible difference: a
few agents with infinite persuasion induce a change in
the society much faster than a group of agents with in-
finite adamancy. Adamancy guarantees those agents will
not change opinion, but their ability to persuade is not
changed by this factor. As a consequence, a bigger group
of social pressure is necessary to change the behaviour of
the society.
Let us first look at the phase diagram, comparing the
case with no monitors and no “hard core” represented on
the left panels of Figs. 1 and 2, with the case of 10% of the
population making part of the “hard core” group. These
results are shown in Fig. 4. There is certainly an increase
of the region where opinion x2 is the consensus but the
size is not very different when compared with the original
results. This means that the region of consensus of the
high valued opinion x2 is larger when the “hard core” is
in action, but not as large as when there are monitors.
The paradoxical result is that the region of stability of
the lower opinion is shifted from adamancy equal zero to
regions with finite adamancy around a/〈k〉 = 0.25 for the
delta connectivity distribution and a/〈k〉 = 0.5 for the
exponential one. On the other hand, for very low values
of the adamancy a strip in the area previously occupied
by the lower opinion, becomes now a region of not defined
consensus.
This effect can be verified by doing the same kind of
graphic as the one of Fig. 3. We have represented in Fig. 5
the area of consensus of both opinions as a function of
the fraction of agents that participate in the “hard core”
group of influence. More than 10% of the population tak-
ing part in the “hard core” nucleus is necessary in order
to make the area of the x1 opinion go to zero. Moreover,
the increase of the area with x2 consensus increases much
more slowly than in the case with monitors and arrives to
cover 75% of the total area when the hard core nucleus is
of the order of 70% of the agents.
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From these results it can be concluded that infinite
persuasion is much more effective than infinite adamancy.
We can speculate that it is easier to put 1% monitors in
the society than to educate a group of the order of 15% of
the population. Certainly, in such a case there could be a
social cost to be considered. Police or highway patrols need
to be trained and must be paid. Besides, an effective 1%
“presence” could imply a higher number of agents because
of timetables, localization, etc. Also, in some cases they
could behave in ways different from the “perfect” monitor
we have imagined here: incorruptible agents with infinite
persuasion. On the other hand to educate a hard nucleus
may be easier and cheaper, with a sustained effect and also
a less traumatic one: it is always preferable to convince
people with arguments than with fines.
Nevertheless, in real societies both kinds of compelling
factors are present, and to analyse a more realistic situa-
tion we have performed a simulation where both, monitors
and a hard nucleus, are present. In Fig. 6 we show the di-
agram obtained for the case of 100 hard core agents and
P = 0.01, which represents one monitor every 100 agents.
Although it could be assumed that monitors would mask
the presence of the nuclei, we see that this is not the case,
since both effects are enhanced. Moreover, the region of
x1-consensus vanished and the higher consensus occupies
almost the entire available area.
3 Complex social networks
The previous results, as well as the ones of Ref. [12], were
obtained within a mean field scheme. This means that
at each time step an agent i is randomly selected and
can interact with any other in the system. But a question
arises: How do the phase diagrams change if the underly-
ing structure of the population is different? In other words,
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Fig. 5. Effect of the relative number of educated agents for
a delta distribution of connectivities. Main panel: Fractions of
the total area for which the consensus of opinions x1 and x2 are
obtained (after 100 interactions per agent in average) as a func-
tion of the fraction of core agents. Inset: Area of x1-consensus
in logarithmic scale. Note that the area of x1-consensus goes
to zero when the size of the hard core group is of the order of
12% of the total population.
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Fig. 6. Phase diagram with P = 0.01 and 100 hard core agents,
in a system with 1000 agents. Note that the effects of monitors
and hard core nucleus are mutually magnified.
what happens if the social influence comes from a social
nucleus of close acquaintances and not from a random
chosen group? The effect of the structure and dynamics
of complex networks in the process of opinion formation
has been extensively investigated in recent years. For ex-
ample, Grabowski and Kosinski have analyzed an Ising
model in which agents are endowed of a authority param-
eter and belong to a complex network [22]. In this section
we analyse the case in which the agents are the nodes of
a complex network with a given topology. Thus, agent i
interacts only with his first neighbours in the network.
We explore three archetypical complex networks: a)
the Strogatz-Watts small-world (SW) network, b) the
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) random network (also known as Poisson
network), and c) the Baraba´si–Albert (BA) scale-free net-
work [23,24,25,26]. Small-world networks are particularly
interesting, since they lie at some intermediate point be-
tween fully ordered and fully random networks. They pos-
sess a large degree of local clustering and a relatively small
minimal path length connecting nodes throughout the sys-
tem. To construct a SW network we apply the usual pro-
cedure [23]: we start with a regular ring where each node
has connectivity k and reconnect links at random with
probability β. Varying β makes it possible to evolve from
a regular lattice (β = 0) to a random graph (β = 1). Inter-
mediate values of β generate the so-called small world net-
works. The Erdo¨s-Re´nyi topology corresponds to a Pois-
sonian distribution of connections with mean 〈k〉 = K:
P (k) = e−KKk/k!. Finally, scale-free networks [26] rep-
resent systems where there is a wide distribution of con-
nectivities and are characterized by the presence of a few
“hubs” or elements with an extremely high connectivity.
These hubs hold the network together and produce a very
small minimal path length. Also, the distribution of the
degree follows a power law P (k) ∼ k−n [26].
For the three networks studied we consider an average
connectivity 〈k〉 = 10. Moreover, for the SW network we
fix the value of the parameter β = 0.1 and for the BA
network the exponent is n = 3. All the results of this sec-
tion correspond to a system of 1000 agents and the results
are obtained after 100 interactions per agent (in average).
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Each point of the phase diagrams shown below is the re-
sult of 10 different networks with identical parameters.
3.1 Complex networks and monitors
For sake of clarity, we start this section by analysing to
what extent the original phase diagram (Fig. 1, left panel)
changes if we put the agents on the nodes of a complex
network. This is shown in the left panels of Fig. 7 for the
SW, ER and BA networks (top, center and bottom, re-
spectively). In all cases the most remarkable difference is
the reduction of the area of x2-consensus, indicating that
networks are less effective to propagate the right behaviour
than random interactions. This fact can be understood if
we remember the mechanism of selection in the mean field
approach: each time that an agent is chosen the k part-
ners are different (because they are picked at random).
This seems to be more effective to propagate information
(or, in this case, an opinion) than any static network. We
also verify that consensus is reached in networks, but at
times much larger than in the mean field case. However,
a significative difference between the networks is that for
the SW one the region of stability of the lower valued
opinion disappears. This means that networks are ineffi-
cient to propagate both opinions, and worse for the lower
valued one. Random (ER) or BA networks exhibit larger
regions of stability for both opinions, preserving a very
small region of stability of opinion x1.
Now, we include in the dynamics the effect of moni-
tors, keeping in mind that this means that each agent has
a probability P of interacting with one monitor, but the
monitors are “flying agents,” not fixed in the network. In
this situation and for one monitor every 100 agents one
observes in Fig. 7 that the area of x1-consensus disap-
pears, whereas the x2-consensus area grows, although not
as much as in the mean field case.
3.2 Social pressure in complex networks
In this section we study the effect of a hard core group
inside the complex network. In the left panels of Fig. 8 we
show the case in which a nucleus of 100 agents is included
in a society composed by 1000 agents. Although the region
of x2-consensus grows compared with the case without
monitors or nucleus (left panels of Fig. 7), the effect of
the educated nucleus seems to be much less significant
than in the case with monitors.
For the sake of completeness we also include the results
for the most realistic case of having together monitors
(P = 0.01) and a group of 100 educated agents. The cor-
responding cases for the three model networks are shown
in the right panels of Fig. 8.
Finally, we present in Fig. 9 the relative areas of the
x1 and x2 opinions for the three complex networks. In the
left panel we plot this as a function of the concentration
of monitors, P , whereas in the right panel we use the frac-
tion of agents participating in the hard core. A very small
number of monitors is, again, very effective to induce a
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Fig. 7. Phase diagrams of networks, with free agents and with
monitors. Top: SW network. Center: ER network. Bottom: BA
network. Left panels: neither monitors or hard core nucleus.
Right panels: one monitor every 100 agents (P = 0.01). The
meaning of the gray scale and symbols is the same as in the
previous figures.
change in the population. As in the mean field model,
just 1 monitor every 100 agents is enough to suppress the
consensus of x1, and ten times as many are necessary to
reach consensus of x2. This reflects the fact that monitors
are outside of the network. The intermediate region, of
neither consensus of x1 nor x2, instead, shows differences
between the networks: the SW model is more effective in
the dissemination of x2, and the BA model is the worst.
We conjecture that the short-cut links characteristic of the
former are responsible for this advantage, while the hubs
of the latter can hinder the process. On the other hand
the educated hard core only produces consensus of x2 for
very high (and unrealistic) concentrations. Nevertheless,
the consensus of x1 effectively disappears for much smaller
cores (see the inset of Fig. 9, right panel). This effect is
achieved with a minimal core in the case of the SW model.
Both the BA and the ER graphs require bigger ones, al-
beit also rather small: about 1% and 5% of the population
respectively.
It is also interesting to remark that the SW network
is more efficient to optimize the work of the monitors,
while it is the less efficient in the case of action of the
hard core nucleus. On the other hand, the opposite result
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Fig. 8. Phase diagrams of networks, with an educated nu-
cleus and monitors. Top: SW network. Center: ER network.
Bottom: BA network. Left panels: just 100 hard core agents.
Right panels: 100 hard core agents and 1 monitor every 100
agents (P = 0.01).
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Fig. 9. Effect of the relative number of monitors (left panel)
and educated agents (right panel) when they are distributed
on three different social networks. The plots show the relative
areas of the two consensus regions. Note that the scale is the
same for the vertical axis in both graphs, but is different for
the two abscissas.
is observed for the BA network. Moreover, the structure
of the networks is clear when one considers the hard core
nucleus, but in the case of monitors, if P > 0.1 the details
of the network become irrelevant.
In conclusion, if the agents are on a (not evolving)
network, the effect of monitors is very similar to the mean
field situation, and this is so because the monitors are
“outside” of the network. On the other hand, when ed-
ucated groups are introduced, the dynamics of opinions
is very slow and the change to the appropriate behaviour
is almost impossible for a reasonable number of members
of the educated group. The fact that the educated group
is distributed at random and has always the same neigh-
bours, makes very hard to induce the correct behaviour in
the society.
4 Discussion and conclusions
From the previous results, one can conclude that the pres-
ence in a society of some agents with infinite persuasion
(the monitors) seems to be more effective than to have a
group of agents with infinite adamancy (the core of edu-
cated agents). But, as we said above, the social cost should
be taken into account to have a more complete picture of
the problem. On the one hand, a significant limitation
is that monitors (police or highway patrols) need to be
trained and paid. Also, the number of them necessary to
accomplish the percentage P of monitors per agent that
our model indicates, should be multiplied at least by 3 to
consider 8 hours work shifts.
Even within the limitations of a toy model, it is worth
comparing our results with a few data from real societies.
Our model has several parameters that have not been fit-
ted to data, such as the ratio between the values of the
opinions, the size of the influence group, or the distribu-
tion of adamancy in the population. Some of them may
indeed be very difficult to quantify precisely. Nevertheless
we have explored a range of values for these (not shown
in this paper) to test for the robustness of the analysis.
Even if it has anecdotal value, let us check some statistics
about the number of policemen or traffic control agents,
which are available on-line. For example, the average num-
ber of agents per 100, 000 habitants is 207 in Canada and
the US and 307 in Western Europe [27]. In Porto Ale-
gre, Brazil, the City Council intends to have 700 traffic
agents by 2014, year of the FIFA World Coup [28]. This
figure represents 100 agents every 100, 000 automobiles.
The numbers we found in our simplified model, necessary
to reduce the “wrong behaviour” to very low levels, is of
the order of one monitor every 100 to 1, 000 agents, i.e.
100 to 1, 000 every 100, 000 agents, well within the ONU
statistics for North America or Western Europe, and also
for Porto Alegre projects of traffic control.
It is also important to notice that monitors in real life
do not work twenty four hours a day, nor do they behave
as incorruptible agents with infinite persuasion. In Ar-
gentina, for example, several major cities may have about
500 policemen per 100, 000 inhabitants (unofficial figures
[29]) but they are unable to reduce offences against per-
sons and properties, with and without violence, to levels
tolerated by the society.
On the other hand, it is difficult to evaluate the number
of educated people, even in simple cases like the respect
of traffic rules. The education of a group of the society to
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form the “hard nucleus” of the model may well be eas-
ier and cheaper, and the effect may be more sustained in
time. Certainly a realistic situation should include both
approaches: monitors and education. However, it is inter-
esting to remark that the effect of the educated group is
much bigger when agents interact at random. This means
that social mobility and exchanges with different people
are very enriching and favor the diffusion and adoption
on the more valued social attitudes. When the educated
agents are in fixed locations within a network, their ac-
tion is less effective and almost unable to induce majors
changes with reasonable numbers for the fraction of the
educated population. A rigid and limited network of ac-
quaintances can impede or delay the adoption of them.
In any case, it is evident from our results that the
combination of both, monitors and educated groups, can
change the social behaviour in reasonable lapses of time,
and also that the results are improved when the social
interactions exhibit dynamic interactions, allowing the
agents to observe and compare their behaviour with a
large fraction of the society.
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